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Managerial Turnover on Team 
Performance: 
A Study of Major League Baseball 
 
BETH TALENTOWSKI
I.  Introduction 
 
 The basic structure of life is that of a ladder and 
many aspire for the top.  Those stationed on the 
bottom rungs are determined to continue climbing 
and those at the top will work hard to stay there, but 
it is not always that easy.  All corporations and 
organizations are based on a large hierarchical 
structure that separates ownership, power, control, 
and performance.  This composition of power makes 
top management one of the most scrutinized 
positions in any organization from large firms to 
small nonprofit organizations to sporting clubs.   
 
The manager, in sports in particular, is an extremely 
volatile position that is under constant evaluation by 
club owners and other officials in the front office.  
Managers are responsible for making the day-to-day 
decisions and ensuring the team performs well and 
gets results.  They are subjected to the public eye as 
all actions taken and decisions made are widely 
known and analyzed, making them an easy target 
when things turn sour and performance slumps.   
 
This study aims at answering two questions: Why 
does a manager get fired and what impact does 
dismissing the field manager of a baseball team have 
on subsequent team performance?  It is 
hypothesized that a manager will be fired when a 
team is performing poorly.  If this is the case, a new 
manager should improve performance; however, the 
fans and chief executives do not recognize the other 
potential factors that lead to meager performance.  
Is it realistic to believe that getting rid of a manager 
will automatically lead to increased winning 
percentages in a team?  The decision to focus on 
management within sports was made based on the 
fact that sports foster an environment in which there 
is a huge cultural, social and economic impact on 
today‘s society (Audas et al., 1999).  In one-way or 
another, a majority of the population can relate to 
the sporting world.  In addition, team performance is 
easily measured in baseball making the data needed 
for this study accessible.   
 
It is hypothesized that managers will be dismissed 
when a team is suffering from poor results.  In 
regards to performance following the said change in 
management there are a number of competing 
theories and hypotheses.  A reverse human capital 
theory states that a change in management will 
cause performance to suffer even more as there is no 
discernable difference in managerial abilities across 
current managers and the change simply disrupts 
the team even more.  The human capital theory, on 
the other hand, hypothesizes that a change in 
management produces better results and an increase 
in performance due to the assumption that the new 
manager coming in is better equipped than the 
previous.  Finally, the scapegoat theory hypothesizes 
that a change in management has no significant 
impact on team performance as the manager is fired 
as a scapegoat and not the true source of problems 





 The Park Place Economist, Volume XVIII 62 
II. Literature Review 
 
There seems to be a general consensus with past 
research on the effect of performance on managerial 
turnover: when performance is bad, the manager 
goes.   Managerial retention is highly contingent on 
firm performance.  This relationship is evidenced in 
a study by Eitzen and Yetman (1972), in which finds 
that unsuccessful basketball teams experienced more 
coaching changes as coaches failed to produce a 
winner were replaced.  Other research by Lieberson 
and O‘Connoer (1972), Helmich (1977), and 
McEachern (1975) all discovered that chief 
executives at large firms were more likely to change 
when the firm was experiencing declining profits.  
The following study expands this research to include 
more data on sports organizations.  Porter and 
Scully (1982) identified a basic ―survival of the 
fittest‖ idea in their study in which a manager is 
responsible for transforming scarce resources into 
outputs, and failure to do so results in dismissal.  
They found that managerial skill contributes 
significantly to the production process through an 
analysis of managerial marginal revenue product 
(Maximaino 2006).  These findings agree with the 
others above that suggest poor performance leads to 
managerial discharge, an idea which is consistent 
with the human capital theory. 
 
There is not as much unanimous consensus when it 
comes to the changes in performance, or lack 
thereof, following a change in management.  Grusky 
(1963, 1964) looked at professional baseball teams 
and found that managerial turnover was more likely 
to occur in teams that were doing poorly and once a 
new manager took over, performance suffered even 
more.  This hypothesis is tested and supported by 
Carroll (1984) and Brown (1982), who studied 
newspaper publishers and football coaches, 
respectively.  Both found that instead of improving 
performance by hiring a new person, it disrupted the 
flow and set things back even further.   
 
On the contrary, Guest (1962) and Davis-Blake 
(1986) suggest a positive relationship between new 
management and performance.  These hypotheses 
stem from the notion that there is a novelty effect 
that accompanies new management in which new 
and unique ideas lead to improved performance and 
the idea that the new management is simply more 
competent and knowledgeable than its successor. 
 
Many other studies found middle ground results 
where there was no conclusive significant 
relationship between managerial succession and 
performance.  In his population ecology theory, 
Aldrich (1979) claims that organizational 
performance is based solely on environmental 
factors, thereby ruling out any impact of internal 
management.  Gamson and Scotch (1964) also 
conclude there is no significance between 
management firing and the resulting performance of 
a team.  In terms other than sports, Boeker (1992) 
finds, in his study of the role of management in a 
corporation, that when a firm is performing poorly 
and has a powerful top executive, instead of stepping 
down or being replaced the high executive will 
dismiss top management instead as a scapegoat 
(Boeker, 1999). 
 
In summary, the literature suggests that a manager 
will be fired when the team they manage fails to 
perform well.  In addition, the literature provides a 
number of different views when focusing on the 
effect of dismissal.  Some studies suggest a new 
manager has the ability to turn things around and 
improve a franchise, while others find that a new 
manager does nothing but complicate matters more.  
Due to the lack of consensus in previous literature, 
this paper is designed to determine which theory and 




III. Theoretical Review 
 
 This paper is set up as a competing theories 
framework, with a human capital based theory 
competing with a scapegoating theory.  A simple 
human capital theory is employed to assess 
productivity of a manager and the probability of 
turnover.  The manager or coach is responsible for 
transforming the given inputs into wins (Fizel & 
D‘Itri 1997).  Essentially, each team is a production 
function in which certain playing inputs, such as 
skill, team cohesion and decision making, lead to an 
output, such as number of wins or ranking.  This 
theory suggests that as long as a manager is utilizing 
all his inputs efficiently and effectively, the team will 
perform and he will retain his position.  Dawson and 
Dobson (2002) looked into this idea as well and 
analyzed the variance among managers based on a 
human capital framework.  Differences are 
evidenced in areas of shirking, ability and 
experience.  In relation to a human capital model, 
the higher the ability and experience, the better the 
performance. 
 
Another theory that explains team performance and 
branches from the human capital theory is the 
common-sense one-way causality theory, which 
focuses on the idea that the field manager of a 
baseball team is the prime influencer on the 
performance of his team.  For this reason, when a 
team is not doing well, the manager is consequently 
fired.  This theory supports the fact that the clubs 
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that have done the worst over the years are the same 
clubs that have changed their management most 
frequently.  Hopefully by replacing the old manager, 
a new, more effective manager will take his place and 
lead the team to a more successful season.  As  
Haveman (1993) found, succession improves 
performance by reducing conflict and enabling the 
organization to be more aware of the environmental 
demands (Haveman, 1993). 
 
In response to the theories above, is it always the 
manager‘s fault when a team is not doing well?  
What about the players and the front office?  Maybe 
teams with high turnover perform worse because the 
manager is not the issue and attention should be 
focused elsewhere.  A number of conflicting theories 
attempt to explain this relationship between team 
performance and management, specifically 
managerial turnover.  These theoretical notions 
include the idea that turnover leads to improved 
performance partially due to a novelty effect and in 
part based on the notion that the successor can avoid 
the errors his predecessor made.  The hypothesis 
suggested by this human capital argument is that a 
team‘s win-loss record will improve with dismissal.   
 
Another possibility that is also consistent with 
human capital theory is that the opposite will take 
place and the relationship between turnover and 
success is actually negative; the higher the turnover 
rates, the lower probability for success. A new 
manager will disrupt the team and lead to conflict 
(Grusky 1963).  Haveman (1993) broaches this 
notion as well arguing that succession diminishes 
performance because it disrupts routines, interrupts 
command, and increases employee insecurity 
(Haveman, 1993).  This theory suggests that 
management change disrupts productivity and 
hypothesizes a decrease in winning percentage. 
 
Finally, there is the scapegoat theory. Unlike the 
preceding theories, the scapegoat theory suggests 
there is not a significant relationship between 
managerial effectiveness and performance, thus 
negating any perceived impact of succession on team 
quality (Gamson and Scotch 1964).  In this case, 
managerial action is more a symbolic act than 
anything else (Haveman 1993).  Forces external to a 
manager‘s control substantially effect organizational 
outcomes; therefore limiting a leader‘s impact on 
organizational performance.  Decisions made by the 
field manager have little impact in the realm of the 
talent he is given to work with. For example, with a 
different manager, would the New York Yankees not 
perform as well regardless of the extreme talent 
throughout the team?  Probably not.  However, since 
the field manager is the most publicized official in a 
sports organization, when a team is not performing 
up to par, it is easy to get rid of the person making 
the day to day decisions, not only to focus the blame, 
but to appease the fans who are looking for some 
hope for change and improvement for their 
hometown team.   
One way to show that it is not the effectiveness of the 
manager that determines success is the mere fact 
that managers that have been fired by one 
organization enjoy good perspective employment 
opportunities as coaches in other clubs.  Although 
one manager may be slightly more effective than 
another, the variance among talent in managers is so 
small it is seemingly a constant (Gamson and Scotch 
1964).  Based on this information, often times it 
seems as if a change in management reflects an 
insignificant change in performance, not because of 
the turnover, but because the decision to hire the 
manager was made based on scapegoating and the 
real issues are not addressed.    All teams experience 
a ―slump‖ in performance at some point in the 
season and firing the field manager has become a 
―convenient‖ way to make adjustments in team 
dynamic even though real improvement needs to 
stem from long-term organizational decisions.  The 
front office and players can blame the manager for 
responsibilities that may in actuality fall on their 
shoulders.  Forces external to the leader‘s control 
that substantially affect an organization‘s outcome, 
thus limiting the manager‘s overall impact.  The 
scapegoating theory suggests that management 
change has an insignificant effect on the team‘s win-
loss record. 
 
IV. Empirical Model and Data 
 
This study uses a two-stage analysis; first to 
determine when or why managers are fired followed 
by a natural experiment in which winning 
percentages from teams that experienced mid-
season changes in management will be analyzed  in 
order to gauge any increases or decreases in 
performance.  The 13 teams in the American League 
will be analyzed from 1998-2008.  These years were 
chosen as they contain the most recent data and past 
studies have not focused on this era.  Within these 
years a total of 30 management changes took place, 
17 of which were within season changes.  A probit 
regression will be used to analyze the following: 
 
Manager Change= B1+B2WP+B3CWP+B4Salary. 
 
WP is the winning percentage in the year in question 
and CWP is the change in winning percentage from 
the year in question and the preceding year.  For the 
change variable, the winning percentage from the 
year t-1 is subtracted from the winning percentage in 
year t.  Therefore, a negative value signifies the 
winning percentage was greater in year t-1, thus 
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demonstrating a decline in performance over the two 
years and vice versa.  It is necessary to include both 
winning percentage and the change in order to take 
into account teams that have had a slump in 
performance between the years and those teams that 
have continuously performed poorly.  Teams with 
consistently poor results would have no significant 
change in winning percentage, but are still 
performing subpar, making them a strong candidate 
for change.  Salary has been included to account for 
expectations.  A team with a higher salary cap will 
have more money to spend on the top players; 
therefore increasing people‘s expectations for the 
season.  With higher expectations there is a higher 
chance they will not be met, leading to disappointing 
results and the dismissal of the manager.  This is a 
difficult variable to gauge as the reverse could 
potentially be true as well when expectations are 
removed from the equation.  A higher salary, in 
general, translates to better players and more wins, 





In the event a management change took place in 
between years, the change was attributed to the 
season before change.  This is based on the 
assumption that the performance of the team during 
that season was subpar so a change was made before 
the start of the next season.  A problem with this 
model is the time of turnover; within the season or 
outside of the season.  For out of season turnover, 
factors such as trades and training can impact the 
performance of the players and team, therefore 
affecting the winning percentage but having little to 
do with management.  This discrepancy can skew the 
results showing a favorable increase in performance 
from one manager to the next.   
he first model incorporates all 30 management 
changes, but only the 18 observations that 
experienced in season change will be used in the 
second.  To accurately determine the effect of the 
change itself on performance, a simple comparison 
of winning percentages before and after a 
management change took place in teams that 
experienced mid-season changes will be carried out.  
Winning percentages from before and after the 
change will be compared and analyzed to detect any 
significant improvement or decline in performance.  
By focusing on teams that changed managers within 
a single season, other outside factors will be 
controlled for.  No factors, such as salary cap or team 
composition will have changed.  The only factor that 
can have an impact on the team is the manager, thus 
any changes in performance can be attributed to the 
change in management.  This first model will help 
lay the groundwork for determining the effect of a 
change on the team.   
he data for this study comes from Major League 
Baseball‘s season statistics.  Such websites include 
The Baseball Almanac and Baseball Reference where 
player, game, season, and coach statistics are kept 
dating back to when teams first emerged on the 
professional baseball scene.  Information on manger 
change and winning percentages comes from the 
Baseball Almanac.  The other variables are  from The 







V.  Results  
Table 1: Table of Variables 
Name   Definition Expected Sign 
MC Dummy Variable for management change.  A value of 1 
is yes, 0 is no. 
Dependent Variable 
WP The teams winning percentage in year t. Negative 
CWP The teams change in winning percentage from year t to 
year t-1  [t-(t-1)] 
Negative 
Salary The teams available salary in year t. Unknown 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Observation Min Max Mean Std. Dev. 
MC 154 .1818 .3870 0 1 
WP 154 .5038 .0787 .265 .716 
CWP 152 -.0005 .0728 -.257 .192 
Salary 154 7.05e7 3.71e7 1.58e7 2.09e8 
 The Park Place Economist, Volume XVIII 65 
The first model is a nonlinear estimation, a marginal 
effects probit regression, to evaluate the probability 
of the occurrence of the dependent variable, MC: 
 
Manager Change=B1+B2WP+ B3CWP+B4Salary. 
 
The coefficients can be interpreted as the estimated 
effect of a one unit change in the independent 
variable on the probability of a manager change.  




Table 3: Dprobit Regression 
 dF/dX Std. Err. Z P>z 95% CI 
MC      
WP -.79 .47 -1.66 0.096* -1.70, .13 
CWP -.94 .47 -1.96 0.05** -1.87, -.01 
Salary 4.32e-10 9.26e-10 .47 0.64 -1.4e-9, 2.2e-9 
N=154 
r-square= .08 
*denotes significance at the .1 level  **denotes significance at the .05 level 
 
After running the regression, all coefficients 
emerged with their expected sign.  Both winning 
percentage and change in winning percentage were 
significant, while salary did not have a significant 
impact on managerial dismissal.  This could be the 
case because the public may not be aware of a team‘s 
exact salary expenditure and therefore do not use it 
as a means of judging the performance of the team.  
The coefficient of -0.79 suggests that with a one 
percent increase in winning percentage, the 
probability of managerial dismissal decreases by 
0.79 percent.  Similarly, a one percent increase in 
change in winning percentage, meaning the team is 
performing better in the current year relative to the 
years before, translates to a decrease in chance of 
removal of 0.94 percent.  These findings are 
consistent with the hypothesis that it is when 
performance suffers that managers have to worry 
about being let go. 
 
Now that evidence shows why managers are fired, it 
is important to look at the effect of this action on 
team performance.  First, the average winning 
percentage for teams that experienced mid-season 
change was computed and analyzed against teams 
that had no change.  A comparison of means can be 
seen in Table 4. 
 
 
Table 4: Comparison of Means 
Variable Overall Mean Change in Manager No Change in Manager 
WP .5038 .4334 .51 
CWP -.0005 -.0431 .01 
 
Data for change, the winning percentage for a team 
that experiences a change in management, was 
collected only from teams that experience 
managerial turnover within a season.  Data for no 
change was only collected from teams that 
experience no change in management, including a 
change between years.  By doing this it is possible to 
look at change and no change as two separate 
entities.  It is clear that mean winning percentage 
decreases in years there is an in season management 
change for a team.  This finding suggests that the 
new manager did not improve the record for the 
team in that year.  Looking at the table, it is clear 
there is a large difference in the means 
corresponding to a change in winning percentage 
between change in management and no change in 
management.  The negative mean for change 
suggests that teams performed worse in the year of 
the change compared to the year before.  This value 
also implies a decline in performance in the year of a 
management change.   
 
More direct observation produces some unbalanced 
results.  When looking at straight winning 
percentages for each manager in the season of 
change, 13 of the 17 observations showed an increase 
in winning percentage, while only four showed a 
decrease in winning percentage from the manager 
who started the season to the manager who finished 
the season.  This statistic proposes an increase in 
performance on average of 0.05, or five percent.  In a 
season that typically has 162 games, five percent 
translates to about 8 games, which in most cases is 
significant.  The winning percentages for most teams 
tend to cluster around 0.500, or 50%.  An extra eight 
games won could move a team up significantly in the 
standings, especially when the difference between 
the first and second place teams is usually only a few 
games.  This finding is in accordance with the 
human capital theory in which the new manager was 
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better equipped than the previous and was able to 
help the team.  However, the data also contained a 
few outliers, which skewed the mean upwards.  In 
one case, the initial manager was only in his position 
for six games and did not win any of them.  This 
caused the increase in winning percentage to be 
.355, much higher than normal.  With this 
observation excluded, the average increase was only 
0.03, or roughly five games.  Although five games is 
still an improvement, it is not enough to drive a last 
place team into first.  In addition, those teams whose 
performance suffered under new manager, on 
average, saw a decrease of 0.075 in their winning 
percentage.  This value translates to 11 games which 
could set a team back significantly.  See Table 5 for a 




Table 5: Comparison of Winning Percentages 
WP Manager 1 WP Manager 2 Change in WP 
.476 .418 -.058 
.420 .430 .010 
.551 .395 -.156 
.453 .467 .014 
.384 .462 .078 
.000 .355 .355 
.348 .385 .037 
.242 .294 .052 
.577 .512 -.065 
.347 .400 .053 
.286 .392 .106 
.383 .655 .272 
.393 .463 .070 
.423 .400 -.023 
.473 .580 .107 
.385 .389 .004 
.294 .384 .090 
 
The table above shows the winning percentage of 
each team that experienced a management change 
under both managers.  A negative value for change 
in WP shows a decline in performance with the new 
manager.  By looking at the table it is clear that 
performance increased on more occasions with a 
new manager.  However, closer analysis shows that 
teams that did better won an average of five more 
games, while those who suffered lost an average of 11 
more games under new management.  This varied 
data makes it difficult to ascertain if the impact of a 
new manager is positive or negative.  There is not 
enough confidence in either direction, showing that  
a change in management has no overall, consistent, 
impact on team performance.  A team may win more 
or lose more games under new supervision, but it is 
not significant enough to state that a manager has 
certain, concrete effects on team performance.  
Although not proven, these findings open up the 
possibility of the scapegoat theory. 
 
VI.  Conclusion 
 
Based on the results of the multiple regressions and 
analyses described above, it is clear that on average a 
manager is fired when his team is performing poorly.   
 
It is not as clear; however, what the impact of this 
change is on performance.  The average comparison 
of mean winning percentages across teams that 
experienced a within season change compared to  
 
those who completed a whole season with one 
manager implies that a new manager is ineffective in 
boosting winning percentage in the year they took 
over.  On the other hand, when comparing the 
winning percentage of a new manager to its 
predecessor, it seems as if the manager is able to 
increase performance, even if only a few games.  
Although this data shows more teams saw improved 
performance, those who suffered did so by a much 
larger margin than those who saw increases in 
winning percentage.  In order to fully interpret this 
finding, it is imperative to determine what number 
of extra wins is significant.   
 
Overall, the change in winning percentage, whether 
positive of negative, is seemingly inconsequential 
showing that a change in management has no 
significant impact on team performance.  Without 
knowing the inner workings of a baseball 
organization it is impossible to know the exact 
reason someone was let go and therefore assume an 
act of scapegoating; however, this study shows that 
there is indeed a possibility this theory is correct 
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given the lack of substantial improvement in a team 
once a new manager replaces the ―problematic‖ one.   
 
To expand on this idea in the future and improve 
upon this research, future research should consider, 
the winning percentage in the seasons following 
dismissal seasons Although this brings in some 
confounding factors, it would be interesting to see 
how the new manager does over time and how 
performance changes.  It is entirely possible that a 
team performs well initially with the new manager 
due to a novelty effect, but after some time the same 
unsolved problems emerge and performance once 
again begins to slump. 
 
It would also be beneficial to look at other factors 
that influence team performance.  Initially a third 
model was under consideration to assess which 
variable has the greatest impact on winning 
percentage.  The additional variables under 
consideration are variables that are out of the 
manager‘s control yet are vital aspects of a sporting 
organization, such as salary cap, draft picks, slugging 
percentage, etc.  The human capital theory suggests 
that proper use of inputs is enough for success, but 
what if the inputs are sub par?  If the scapegoating 
hypothesis is correct, the other factors would be 
found to be stronger than management, proving that 
in times of distress and poor play managers are let 
go due to scapegoating.  The problem with this 
model, given the time constraints, is the inability to 
determine a measure for management.  The MC 
variable used previously could not be used in this 
case because it was not the change in management 
under consideration, but the effect of the manager in 
general.    
 
Another important variable that could add 
considerably to this study is a measurement of 
managerial effectiveness.  It has been said that there 
is a very small variance between managerial abilities, 
but the ability to account for these difference could 
impact the results substantially.   
 
Many implications arise from this research for 
teams, managers, and franchises.  It is clear that a 
manager is fired when a team is performing poorly, 
but a new manager is not necessarily capable of 
fixing this.  It is unreasonable to continuously 
replace manager after manager until a suitable one is 
found.  The baseball industry as a whole needs to 
start exploring other options.  Different trainers and 
training techniques can be brought in and sport 
psychologists can help improve team morale when 
play is suffering.  Multiple fires and hires are 
financially straining on any organization.  Finding 
out root causes for failure can prove to me cost 
effective in the long run.  The ideas presented in this 
paper can also be generalized to businesses and 
corporations.  By implementing new practices and 
exploring the causes of problems, businesses can 
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